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ABSTRACT 
 
 The paper considers transitions in the health and disability status of persons as they age.  
In particular, we explore the relationship between health and disability at younger ages (say 50) 
and health and disability in future ages.  We consider for example, the future health path of 
persons who are in good health at age 50 compared to the future health path of persons who are in 
poor health at age 50.   
 To do this, we develop a model that jointly considers health and mortality.  The key 
feature of the model is the assumption of underlying “latent” health that determines both 
mortality and self-reported responses to categorical health and disability questions.  Latent health 
allows for heterogeneity among individuals and allows for correlation of health status over time, 
thus allowing for state dependence as well as heterogeneity.  The model also allows for 
classification errors in self-reported response to categorical health and disability questions.  All of 
these are important features of health and disability data, as we show with descriptive data.  The 
model accommodates the strong relationship between self-reported health status and mortality, 
which is critical to an understanding of the paths of health and disability of the survivors who are 
observed in panel data files.   
Our empirical analysis is based on all four cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) -- the HRS, AHEAD, CODA and WB cohorts).   We find that self-reported health and 
self-reported disability correspond very closely to one another in the HRS.  We find that both 
self-reported health and disability are strong predictors of mortality.  Health and disability at 
younger ages are strongly related to future health and disability paths of persons as they age.   
There are important differences in health and disability paths by education level, race, and 
gender. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The aging of populations and the prospect of a rising number of disabled persons 
has generated an increasing interest in understanding the causes and the precursors of 
disability.   A perhaps countervailing motivation to understand disability has been the 
finding by some analysts of declining age-specific disability rates over the past two or 
three decades, in the United States in particular.  Declining age-specific disability rates 
could moderate the projected increase in the incidence of disability due to aging 
populations.   
In contrast to the finding of declining health disability, there has been an increase 
in participation in the Disability Insurance program in the United States (see Duggan et 
al., in this volume).  The participation rate in disability insurance programs has also 
increased in some European countries.  Moreover, DI participation rates vary 
dramatically across the industrial countries (Aarts et al. 1996; Börsch-Supan, 2005).  The 
differences across countries, however, are almost surely explained in large part by 
differences in the provisions of disability insurance programs (Gruber and Wise, 1999 
and 2004). 
 In this paper, we explore the pathways to disability in the United States.  Our 
analysis is based on data in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  We exploit the rich 
information in the HRS to shed light on transitions into and out of disability and on the 
relationship of disability to self-reported health.  We consider health precursors of 
disability and consider how disability is related to education and other socioeconomic 
circumstances of individuals.  Our hope is that by advancing our understanding of the 
precursors and the correlates of disability we will be in a better position to project future 
disability rates and to perhaps even to understand how the incidence of disability might 
be reduced.   
By way of introduction to the HRS data, we show the responses to two questions, 
one pertaining to disability and the other the health status.  Figure 1.1 shows responses to 
this question: ”Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or 
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amount of paid work you can do?”.  The figure shows the steady increase in work-related 
disability from about 20 percent at age 50 to about 60 percent at age 85 and above. 
Figure 1-1: Work-Related Disability in the Health and Retirement Study 
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Note: Share of respondents who report a disability which limits their ability to work.  Source: Authors’ 
calculations based on the Health and Retirement Study, merged data of AHEAD, CODA, HRS, and WB 
cohorts. For cohort and variable definition, see Section 2. 
 
Figure 1-2 shows the proportion of persons who say they are in poor or fair health 
(as distinct from good, very good, or excellent health).  By comparing Figures 1-1 and 1-
2, it can be seen that the HRS data show a close correspondence between work-related 
disability and self-reported health.  (The HRS data for the United States differ from 
European data that show a divergence between trends in self-reported disability and 
trends in self-reported health.1 
                                                 
1 See Börsch-Supan (2004) 
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Figure 1-2: Prevalence of Poor and Fair Health in the Health and Retirement Study 
 
Note: Share of respondents who self-assess their health as fair or poor.  Source: Authors’ calculations based 
on the Health and Retirement Study, merged data of AHEAD, CODA, HRS, and WB cohorts. For cohort 
and variable definition, see Section 2. 
 To understand health and disability transitions, of course, panel data like those in 
the HRS are required.   Several avenues of prior work help to inform our analysis.  The 
most widely used measure of health has been self-rated health because of its predictive 
power for the onset of disease and mortality (Idler and Kasl, 1995; Burstrom and 
Fredlund, 2001; Borg and Kristensen, 2000; Hurd, McFadden and Merrill, 2001; Power, 
Mathews and Manor, 1998), and because of its wide availability in social science surveys 
such as the HRS.  
 Models of health dynamics typically begin with estimation of a first-order 
Markov transition equation 
 1 1( | , )t t tP H H X− −  
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Where tH  is health status at time t  and 1tX −  are covariates that are thought to influence 
the rate of transition of health between 1t − and t .  This relationship can be estimated on 
panel data.  Separate estimates by age can reveal whether the effect of X on the transition 
probability varies with age.  In prior research, the determinants X of the relationship 
between SES and health have included income, wealth, education, occupation, and social 
class.2   
 However, unobserved heterogeneity which has an influence both on X and on tH  
conditional on 1tH −  will cause biased estimation of the casual relationship between H  
and X .  For example, unobserved heterogeneity may be traced to differences in early 
childhood circumstances.  Such differences appear to affect the rate of onset of disease 
later in life (Richards and Wadsworth, 2004; Ravelli et al., 1998; Barker, 1997).  
Childhood circumstances are also likely a determinant of SES status later in life.   
 In models of health transitions, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity often 
produces substantially different results from models that do not account for 
heterogeneity.  For example, Halliday (2005) used the waves of the PSID from 1984-
1997 to study the evolution of self-rated health.  He distinguished healthy and unhealthy 
persons and considered their transition probabilities between the states of “ill” (self-rated 
health fair or poor) and “well” (self-rated health excellent, very good or good.)  He found 
that the transition rates varied substantially between the two groups and that the change in 
the transition rates with age also varied between the two groups.  These differences led 
Halliday to conclude that investments in childhood health would have substantial health 
payoffs later in life.  Models that do not permit heterogeneity could not have come to this 
conclusion. 
 Contoyannis and Jones (2004) allow unobserved heterogeneity to influence the 
choice of healthy and unhealthy behaviours, as well as health status itself.  They find that 
in a model that allows for heterogeneity and controls for the correlation between 
behaviors and unobserved health characteristics the effect of behaviors on health is 
substantially increased.  They conclude that “…over 75% of the total effect of lifestyle on 
                                                 
2 Meer, Miller and Rosen, 2003;  Smith, 2004; Adams et al., 2003; Hurd and Kapteyn, 2003; Wadsworth 
and Kuh, 1997;  Marmot, 1999;  Adda, Chandola and Marmot, 2003; Michaud and van Soest, 2004. 
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the social class gradient [in health] is masked when unobserved heterogeneity is 
ignored.” 3   
 On the other hand, Michaud and van Soest (2004) consider whether SES causes 
health or whether health causes SES, as Adams et al. (2003) had done.  They find that 
controlling for heterogeneity does not substantially alter their results.  But whereas 
Adams et al. conditioned health and wealth changes on as many as 19 health conditions 
and behaviors, Michaud and van Soest used a first-order Markov model and summarized 
health by the first principle component of a large number of health conditions.  In 
estimation there is some similarity between first-order Markov models that control for a 
number of health states and first-order Markov models with unobserved heterogeneity.  
Unobserved health heterogeneity can be at least partially observed.  Indeed, the results of 
Michaud and van Soest are similar to those of Adams et al. with respect to the causal 
flows between SES and health.  
 The method used by Halliday (2005) is similar in spirit to the method we propose 
in this paper.  Our estimations model, however, sets out a more complex error structure 
than his and includes a heterogeneity specification that allows for more extreme levels of 
health and disability.  In addition, we study an older age group and use data from a 
different time period.  We consider higher order Markov processes and use simulation 
methods to explore the implications of  heterogeneity. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  In section 2 we describe the 
data and variables that we use.  In section 3 we present descriptive data on changes in 
self-reported health and self-reported work-related disability during the 8 years between 
the first wave of the HRS in 1992 and the fifth wave in 2000.  In section 4 we use data on 
sequences of self-reported health status to demonstrate that to correctly model health 
transitions, it is critical to account for state dependence, heterogeneity, and classification 
errors in self-reported categorical assessment of health.  In section 5 we present a model 
of health transitions based on a latent (“hidden”) continuous measure of health.  The 
model allows for unobserved heterogeneity, state dependence, and classification error in 
self-reported health and disability.  In section 6 we present results, through simulations 
                                                 
3 Page 986. 
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based on the model.  Section 7 provides a summary of results and suggests further 
analysis based on the model developed in this paper. 
2.  Data and Variable Definition 
This paper is based on all four cohort components of the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS):  
(1) The original HRS cohort, comprising “age eligibles” persons between 51 and 60 
years of age at the time of the first HRS wave in 1992, plus their (potentially 
younger or older) spouses. The age-eligibles therefore represent the birth 
cohorts born between 1931 and 1941. 
(2) The AHEAD cohort (Survey of Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old), 
comprising all persons age 70 or older in 1994, at the time of the first AHEAD 
wave (birth cohorts born before 1923), plus their spouses. 
(3) The cohort comprising “children of the depression age” (CODA), born between 
1924 and 1930--and their spouses--filling the gap between the HRS and the 
AHEAD birth cohorts. 
(4) The cohort of “war babies” (WB) was added in 1998 and included persons who 
became age eligible since the beginning of the HRS in 1992. The WB cohorts 
comprise the birth cohorts born between 1942 and 1947. 
 
Respondents were re-interviewed every two years.  Attrition due to various reasons and 
death were recorded separately, deaths were ascertained with the help of the National 
Death Index.  Figure 2-1 shows the age coverage of the longitudinal data in each of the 
HRS cohorts 
 
  Page 9 of 54 
Figure 2-1: Longitudinal data 
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Work-related disability and self-reported health are the key outcome variables in 
our analysis. Work-related disability is available in all waves for all cohorts, except for 
the first two waves of the AHEAD cohort (1994 and 1996).  Work-related disability is 
constructed from the question: “Do you have any impairment or health problem that 
limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?” (See Figure 1-1.) 
Self-reported health is available in all waves for all cohorts. It is constructed from 
the question: “Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?“.  
Although five categorical choices are allowed--“excellent”, “very good,”  “good,”  “fair,” 
and “poor”—in most of our analyses, we group “excellent,”  “very good.” and “good” in 
one category, and “fair” and “poor” in a second category, as in Figure 1-2 above. 
 Work-related disability and self-reported heath are very closely related in our 
data.  A simple cross-sectional logit regression of work-related disability on various 
health measures shows strong associations between disability and health.  Table 2.2 
shows the odds of having a work-related disability compared to persons who say their 
health is very good or excellent for the pooled data of wave 1 through 5.  For example, 
persons who say they are in poor or fair health are 4.53 times as likely to have a work-
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related disability as persons who say they are in very good or excellent health.  Persons 
who have an additional_IADL are 1.813 time more likely to have a work-related 
disability. And so forth.  
Table 2-2: Work-Related Disability as Function of Self-Reported Health 
 Odds ratio p-value 
Age (splines) --- 0.000 
Female 0.771 0.000 
# health conditions 1.264 0.000 
# fine motor skills 1.159 0.008 
# gross motor skills 0.791 0.000 
# mobility problems 1.598 0.000 
# large muscle activities 1.513 0.000 
# ADLs 1.235 0.000 
# IADLs 1.813 0.000 
health very good or excellent. 1.000 --- 
health good 1.944 0.000 
health poor/fair 4.530 0.000 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS 
 
 
In addition, a similar logit regression of mortality on lagged disability and health 
shows that even after controlling for other health measures, work-related disability is a 
strong predictor of mortality, as shown in Table 2-3.  The table shows that persons who 
say they have a work-related disability are 1.76 more likely to die before the interview for 
the next wave than people who say they are in very good or excellent health, even after 
controlling for the other measures of health in the regression.  
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Table 2-3: Work-Related Disability as Predictor of Mortality 
 Odds ratio p-value 
Age (splines) --- 0.000 
female 0.524 0.000 
disabled 1.760 0.000 
# health conditions 1.254 0.000 
# fine motor skills 1.011 0.874 
# gross motor skills 1.024 0.754 
# mobility problems 1.210 0.000 
# large muscle act. 0.813 0.000 
# ADLs 1.014 0.842 
# IADLs 1.220 0.000 
health very good or excellent. 1.000 --- 
health good 1.310 0.005 
health poor/fair 2.146 0.000 
Source: HRS cohort 
 
 
In summary, self-reported work disability as measured in the Health and 
Retirement Study is strongly related to future longevity.  This relationship is unlikely to 
hold in all countries, in particular in countries where the underlying health of the 
population is close to that in the United States but a much larger fraction of older people 
are receiving benefits from a disability program.  For example there is a very limited 
correlation between work-related disability and self-reported health as reported in the 
German Socio-Economic Panel.4 
3.  Health Transitions in the HRS: From 1992 to 2000 
 In this section, we present descriptive data on health and disability transitions.  
These descriptive data, as well as the data in the next section are intended to inform the 
more formal analysis in sections 4 through 6 and to motivate the econometric 
specification that underlies that analysis. 
 Respondents in the first wave of the HRS in 1992 were between 51 and 61 years 
of age.  Table 3-1 shows transitions by self-reported health status.  About 78 percent of 
respondents reported that they were in good health or better (excellent, very good, good) 
and 22 percent were in fair or poor health.  Eight years later, their health had deteriorated, 
                                                 
4 Börsch-Supan (2001). 
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with only 68 percent of the respondents reporting that they were in good or better health 
and 22 percent reporting that they were in fair or poor health; and 10 percent had died  
(excluding persons who were not longer in the sample—“attrition.”)   The table also 
shows that the transition to poor or fair health and the transition to death vary enormously 
by health status in 1992.  For example, of those who were in good or better health in 
1992, only 11 percent were in poor or fair health in 2000 and only 5 percent had died.  Of 
those who were in poor or fair health in 1992, over 43 percent stayed in poor or fair 
health in 2000  and almost 21 percent had died. 
 Table 2 shows transitions by self-reported disability status.  The transitions 
between 1992 and 2000 are very similar to the self-reported health transitions.  That is, 
the transitions for those who report a work disability are very similar to those who report 
that they are in fair or poor health, and the transitions for those who report no work 
disability are very similar to those who say that they are in good or better health.    In 
addition, the share reporting work-related disabilities in 1992 is almost identical to the 
share reporting poor or fair health in 1992 (78.73 percent compared to 78.17 percent).  
(Attrition rates show little correlation with initial health status or with initial work 
disability status.) 
Table 3-1: 8-Year Transitions for Self-Reported Health in the HRS 
Status in 2000 Status 
In 1992 health good 
or better 
health poor 
or fair dead attrition total 
Health good or better 6,052 1,037 465 1,506 9,060 
 66.8 11.45 5.13 16.62 100 
Health poor or fair 511 1,090 526 403 2,530 
  20.2 43.08 20.79 15.93 100 
Total 6,563 2,127 991 1,909 11,590 
  56.63 18.35 8.55 16.47 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations from HRS. 
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Table 3-2: 8-Year Transitions for Work-Related Disability in the HRS 
Status in 2000 Status 
in 1992 not disabled disabled dead attrition total 
Not disabled 5,735 1,295 500 1,551 9,081 
 63.15 14.26 5.51 17.08 100 
Disabled 517 1,094 490 352 2,453 
  21.08 44.60 19.98 14.35 100 
Total 6,252 2,389 990 1,903 11,534 
  54.2 20.71 8.58 16.5 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS. 
 
 Tables 3-3 and 3-4 show transition rates by health status, by age in 1992, and by 
gender.  Transition rates by health status are in Table 3-3 and by disability status in Table 
3-4.  These tables show, as expected, that death rates are substantially higher for men 
than for women.  For example, of men who report that they are disabled in 1992, over 23 
percent have died by 2000, whereas of women who report they are disabled in 1992 only 
about 16 percent have died by 2000.  Again, these detailed data show a striking 
relationship between health status and death rates at all ages, and between disability 
status and death rates at all ages. For example, for men age 61 who reported that they 
were disabled in 1992, over 38 percent had died by 2000; for those who reported that 
they were not disabled, only about 8 percent had died by 2000.  
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Table 3-3: 8-Year health transitions in the HRS, by age and sex. 
 
Age at 
wave1 obs. 
health 
good+ 
poor/
fair dead 
Attri-
tion   
Age 
at 
wave
1 obs. 
health 
good+ 
poor/
fair dead 
Attri-
tion 
Men, health in wave 1 = good or better  Women, health in wave 1 = good or better 
50 86 66.28 12.79 3.49 17.44  50 117 72.65 11.97 3.42 11.97 
51 340 67.35 10.88 2.94 18.82  51 390 73.33 11.28 2.82 12.56 
52 336 63.99 9.82 6.25 19.94  52 364 75.00 11.54 1.10 12.36 
53 359 60.45 15.04 5.29 19.22  53 340 70.59 11.76 4.41 13.24 
54 302 64.90 10.26 5.30 19.54  54 352 69.89 11.65 4.55 13.92 
55 301 65.78 11.30 5.32 17.61  55 350 73.14 11.14 4.57 11.14 
56 314 64.01 13.06 3.50 19.43  56 344 77.03 7.85 4.65 10.47 
57 311 64.95 11.58 5.14 18.33  57 307 71.99 12.70 4.23 11.07 
58 267 66.29 10.11 8.61 14.98  58 310 75.81 10.97 3.55 9.68 
59 252 61.90 13.49 9.92 14.68  59 292 73.29 13.36 4.11 9.25 
60 297 64.31 9.43 9.76 16.50  60 294 67.01 14.63 5.78 12.59 
61 179 63.69 12.29 7.26 16.76  61 219 73.52 8.22 7.31 10.96 
All 3,344 64.38 11.60 6.04 17.97  Total 3,679 72.82 11.42 4.10 11.66 
 
Men, health in wave 1 = poor/fair  Women, health in wave 1 = poor/fair 
50 18 22.22 44.44 16.67 16.67  50 33 15.15 63.64 15.15 6.06 
51 73 17.81 36.99 30.14 15.07  51 92 25.00 57.61 8.70 8.70 
52 66 22.73 37.88 19.70 19.70  52 99 16.16 57.58 13.13 13.13 
53 79 16.46 44.30 13.92 25.32    53 98 24.49 41.84 16.33 17.35 
54 72 18.06 37.50 25.00 19.44  54 103 16.50 57.28 13.59 12.62 
55 82 19.51 39.02 28.05 13.41  55 109 24.77 57.80 9.17 8.26 
56 76 19.74 40.79 21.05 18.42  56 95 25.26 44.21 18.95 11.58 
57 87 25.29 39.08 24.14 11.49  57 109 23.85 43.12 22.94 10.09 
58 94 14.89 46.81 24.47 13.83  58 108 22.22 60.19 12.96 4.63 
59 84 22.62 32.14 27.38 17.86  59 105 24.76 46.67 18.10 10.48 
60 77 23.38 35.06 31.17 10.39  60 117 23.93 42.74 23.08 10.26 
61 67 13.43 29.85 40.30 16.42  61 62 20.97 45.16 20.97 12.90 
All 875 19.54 38.51 25.60 16.34  Total 1,130 22.39 50.88 16.11 10.62 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort 
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Table 3-4: 8-Year disability transitions in the HRS, by age and sex. 
 
age 
(w1) obs. not disab. disabled dead attrition  age (w1) obs. not disab. disabled dead attrition
Men, not disabled in wave 1    Women, not disabled in wave 1   
50 85 64.71 14.12 3.53 17.65  50 114 67.54 11.40 4.39 16.67 
51 341 66.28 10.26 5.28 18.18  51 406 64.04 17.24 2.22 16.50 
52 329 57.75 15.81 5.47 20.97  52 374 66.58 14.97 1.60 16.84 
53 360 62.50 11.94 5.28 20.28  53 356 61.52 13.48 3.93 21.07 
54 309 61.49 12.94 5.18 20.39  54 350 60.57 14.00 4.29 21.14 
55 304 62.50 12.83 8.22 16.45  55 362 63.81 16.85 4.70 14.64 
56 305 63.61 13.77 2.95 19.67  56 340 62.94 16.76 3.82 16.47 
57 314 60.51 16.24 6.05 17.20  57 298 66.11 13.42 3.02 17.45 
58 270 61.85 12.96 11.11 14.07  58 320 66.25 16.56 3.75 13.44 
59 238 62.61 13.03 10.08 14.29  59 304 63.49 18.09 3.62 14.80 
60 290 65.86 8.28 9.31 16.55  60 306 62.09 16.01 7.19 14.71 
61 181 62.98 13.81 8.29 14.92  61 210 62.86 15.24 5.71 16.19 
Total 3,326 62.57 12.90 6.70 17.83  Total 3,740 63.80 15.59 3.88 16.74 
Men, disabled in wave 1    Women, disabled in wave 1   
50 18 33.33 33.33 16.67 16.67  50 36 25.00 55.56 8.33 11.11 
51 72 20.83 41.67 19.44 18.06  51 74 18.92 55.41 13.51 12.16 
52 72 22.22 40.28 22.22 15.28  52 83 9.64 62.65 10.84 16.87 
53 74 13.51 50.00 14.86 21.62  53 82 18.29 45.12 15.85 20.73 
54 64 15.63 40.63 28.13 15.63  54 104 24.04 51.92 13.46 10.58 
55 78 17.95 46.15 17.95 17.95  55 96 29.17 46.88 9.38 14.58 
56 83 8.43 51.81 21.69 18.07  56 92 26.09 43.48 22.83 7.61 
57 83 21.69 40.96 21.69 15.66  57 111 21.62 45.05 22.52 10.81 
58 90 26.67 38.89 17.78 16.67  58 95 25.26 55.79 8.42 10.53 
59 97 17.53 39.18 24.74 18.56  59 89 24.72 47.19 20.22 7.87 
60 84 19.05 39.29 30.95 10.71  60 101 17.82 49.50 18.81 13.86 
61 65 12.31 27.69 38.46 21.54  61 68 25.00 39.71 23.53 11.76 
Total 880 18.30 41.48 23.07 17.16  Total 1,031 22.11 49.56 16.00 12.32 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort 
 
 
Tables 3-5 and 3-6 show the progression of health status and disability status over 
the first five waves of the HRS.   Each table has three panels: one for persons who were 
age 51 in 1992, one for persons age 61, and one panel for all ages in 1992.  Each panel 
shows data for men and for women separately.  Table 3-5 shows progression of health 
status, by health status in 1992; Table 3-6 shows progression of disability, by disability 
status in 1992.  For each combination of age in 1992, health or disability status in1992, 
gender, and health or disability status in 2000, there are four values. The four values are 
for health or disability status in wave 2, wave 3, and wave 4, and wave 5 of the HRS.  
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The wave 5 values correspond to the 8-years transitions between 1992 and 2000, that are 
shown above.   
For example, consider the progression of health in Table 3-5 for men who were 
age 61 in 1992 and in good or better health.  The progression of the proportion that 
reported they were in good or better health over the next four waves of the HRS are 
shown in the top row of numbers for men.  The proportion in good or better health was 
.87 in the second wave, .82 in the third wave, .70 in the fourth, and .67 in the fifth wave. 
In almost all cases, there is a consistent decline in the proportion in good or better 
health.  And there is a consistent increase in the proportion that has died.  On the other 
hand, the proportion in fair or poor health does not follow a consistent pattern.  The 
reason is the relationship between death and health status.  For example, consider men of 
all ages who were in fair or poor health in 1992—the bottom panel of Table 3-5.  The 
proportion that had died increased from .08 to .15 to .19 to .26, but the proportion in fair 
or poor health declined from .64 to .50 to .48 to .39.   The implication is that those in 
poor health were more likely to die, so that of those remaining fewer and fewer were in 
fair or poor health.  This relationship highlights the strong selection effect that 
disproportionately leaves healthier persons in the sample as age increases.  Similar 
relationships can be seen for the progression of disability as shown in Table 3-6.  
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Table 3-5: Progression of health status by 1992 status, by age and sex. 
 
Initial age = 51         
health   male, wave: female, wave: 
1992 status 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
good+ good+ 0.874 0.824 0.700 0.674 0.854 0.795 0.695 0.703 
  fair- 0.056 0.065 0.126 0.109 0.100 0.105 0.156 0.103 
  dead 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.029 0.000 0.010 0.021 0.028 
  attrition 0.068 0.100 0.156 0.188 0.046 0.090 0.128 0.167 
fair- good+ 0.356 0.315 0.192 0.178 0.293 0.337 0.174 0.239 
  fair- 0.507 0.397 0.438 0.370 0.674 0.543 0.652 0.543 
  dead 0.096 0.178 0.219 0.301 0.011 0.043 0.054 0.087 
  attrition 0.041 0.110 0.151 0.151 0.022 0.076 0.120 0.130 
          
Initial age = 61         
health   male, wave: female, wave: 
1992 status 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
good+ good+ 0.832 0.782 0.659 0.637 0.831 0.772 0.685 0.694 
  fair- 0.123 0.117 0.173 0.123 0.119 0.132 0.142 0.082 
  dead 0.006 0.028 0.050 0.073 0.005 0.009 0.050 0.068 
  attrition 0.039 0.073 0.117 0.168 0.046 0.087 0.123 0.155 
fair- good+ 0.194 0.149 0.179 0.134 0.274 0.226 0.210 0.210 
  fair- 0.612 0.507 0.418 0.299 0.597 0.613 0.532 0.452 
  dead 0.119 0.224 0.269 0.403 0.081 0.113 0.145 0.210 
  attrition 0.075 0.119 0.134 0.164 0.048 0.048 0.113 0.129 
          
Averaged over all ages:        
health   male, wave: female, wave: 
1992 status 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
good+ good+ 0.840 0.764 0.676 0.644 0.850 0.795 0.708 0.696 
  fair- 0.086 0.097 0.131 0.116 0.095 0.099 0.137 0.107 
  dead 0.009 0.026 0.042 0.060 0.006 0.014 0.026 0.037 
  attrition 0.064 0.113 0.151 0.180 0.049 0.092 0.129 0.160 
fair- good+ 0.221 0.246 0.181 0.195 0.255 0.284 0.204 0.212 
  fair- 0.643 0.502 0.480 0.385 0.655 0.565 0.566 0.482 
  dead 0.077 0.145 0.192 0.256 0.041 0.073 0.112 0.154 
  attrition 0.059 0.107 0.147 0.163 0.050 0.077 0.118 0.151 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort 
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Table 3-6: Progression of disability status by 1992 status, by age and sex. 
Initial age = 51         
status   male, wave: female, wave: 
1992 status 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
not disab. not disab. 0.848 0.767 0.696 0.663 0.860 0.748 0.705 0.640 
  disabled 0.082 0.118 0.115 0.103 0.101 0.156 0.149 0.172 
  dead 0.009 0.024 0.035 0.053 0.000 0.007 0.017 0.022 
  attrition 0.062 0.091 0.153 0.182 0.039 0.089 0.129 0.165 
disabled not disab. 0.208 0.181 0.208 0.208 0.253 0.176 0.189 0.189 
  disabled 0.653 0.542 0.486 0.417 0.680 0.676 0.608 0.554 
  dead 0.069 0.125 0.139 0.194 0.013 0.068 0.081 0.135 
  attrition 0.069 0.153 0.167 0.181 0.053 0.081 0.122 0.122 
          
Initial age = 61         
health   male, wave: female, wave: 
1992 status 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
not disab. not disab. 0.840 0.718 0.669 0.630 0.826 0.741 0.676 0.629 
  disabled 0.122 0.188 0.177 0.138 0.122 0.165 0.162 0.152 
  dead 0.006 0.033 0.055 0.083 0.000 0.009 0.043 0.057 
  attrition 0.033 0.061 0.099 0.149 0.052 0.085 0.119 0.162 
disabled not disab. 0.092 0.108 0.138 0.123 0.206 0.209 0.209 0.250 
  disabled 0.692 0.523 0.415 0.277 0.676 0.627 0.522 0.397 
  dead 0.123 0.215 0.262 0.385 0.088 0.104 0.149 0.235 
  attrition 0.092 0.154 0.185 0.215 0.029 0.060 0.119 0.118 
          
Averaged over all ages:        
health   male, wave: female, wave: 
1992 status 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
not disab. not disab. 0.836 0.743 0.683 0.626 0.831 0.756 0.690 0.638 
  disabled 0.092 0.117 0.122 0.129 0.113 0.135 0.146 0.156 
  dead 0.011 0.030 0.047 0.067 0.006 0.015 0.029 0.039 
  attrition 0.061 0.109 0.148 0.178 0.051 0.094 0.135 0.167 
disabled not disab. 0.175 0.185 0.181 0.183 0.183 0.187 0.224 0.221 
  disabled 0.684 0.564 0.490 0.415 0.729 0.669 0.570 0.496 
  dead 0.069 0.128 0.173 0.231 0.044 0.073 0.109 0.160 
  attrition 0.073 0.123 0.155 0.172 0.043 0.071 0.097 0.123 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort 
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4. Modelling Health Transitions: What are the Difficulties? 
 
The tables in section 3 show transition probabilities over an eight-year period and 
from wave to wave in the HRS.  Can these transition probabilities be used to project 
health and disability status into the future?  The apparent relationship between health (or 
disability) and death revealed in Tables 3-5 and 3-6 suggests that the answer is no.  Those 
who remain in the sample are likely to be healthier than those who die.  This section 
demonstrates this and additional features of the data that must be accounted for to 
adequately specify transitions models of self-reported health and work-related disability. 
Since most of this section serves to demonstrate the key issues, most of the presentation 
pertains to our binary indicator of self-reported health (good or better versus fair or 
worse) and to men only. 
The transition probabilities from wave to wave in the HRS are shown in Table 4-1, 
for men who were in good or better health in the first wave. The entries in the table 
represent the average transition probabilities over all waves, by initial age. There are 308 
observations of men initially aged 50 in good or better health in waves 1 through 4.  
Overall, 83.6 percent of them remain in good health in the subsequent wave, while for 
11.2 percent health deteriorates, 0.3 percent die, and 4.9 percent cannot be interviewed in 
the following wave. 
Table 4-1: Average 2-year transition probabilities 
  Age (w1) Obs. health good+ poor/fair dead attrition
Men, lagged health = good or better    
 50 308 83.55 11.18 0.33 4.93 
 51 1,237 85.55 8.13 0.99 5.34 
 52 1,181 83.79 8.94 1.58 5.70 
 53 1,226 82.16 11.47 0.84 5.53 
 54 1,072 84.91 8.08 1.17 5.84 
 55 1,058 84.18 9.59 1.34 4.89 
 56 1,110 83.04 10.51 0.83 5.62 
 57 1,115 84.19 9.47 1.19 5.15 
 58 941 82.99 11.12 1.64 4.25 
 59 887 82.26 12.33 1.61 3.80 
 60 1,051 84.65 8.65 1.85 4.86 
 61 627 82.77 11.76 1.61 3.86 
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  Total 11,813 83.75 9.91 1.27 5.07 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS 
 
 
An important question is whether these 2-year transitions can be used to predict the 
evolution of heath in the longer run. A simple estimate of an 8-year transition probability 
is the 2-year transition probability raised to the power four.  Using this procedure to 
estimate health status in 2000, given health status in 1992 does not work well, however.  
The results are shown in Table 4-2.  The actual proportion of respondents in good health 
is substantially greater than the predicted probability at all ages.  The actual proportion in 
poor or fair health is substantially less than the simulated probability at all ages. 
 
Table 4-2: Projection of 1992-2000 health changes based on 2-year 
average transition probabilities—men in good or better health in wave 1 
  Actual probabilities Predicted probability 
  age (w1) good+ poor/fair dead attrition good+ poor/fair dead attrition 
     
 50 0.663 0.128 0.035 0.174 0.617 0.165 0.041 0.178 
 51 0.674 0.109 0.029 0.188 0.624 0.130 0.058 0.189 
 52 0.640 0.098 0.063 0.199 0.583 0.142 0.072 0.203 
 53 0.604 0.150 0.053 0.192 0.553 0.189 0.053 0.205 
 54 0.649 0.103 0.053 0.195 0.586 0.143 0.065 0.205 
 55 0.658 0.113 0.053 0.176 0.588 0.163 0.075 0.174 
 56 0.640 0.131 0.035 0.194 0.580 0.170 0.052 0.199 
 57 0.650 0.116 0.051 0.183 0.591 0.162 0.067 0.179 
 58 0.663 0.101 0.086 0.150 0.565 0.189 0.093 0.153 
 59 0.619 0.135 0.099 0.147 0.561 0.185 0.104 0.150 
 60 0.643 0.094 0.098 0.165 0.591 0.140 0.103 0.166 
  61 0.637 0.123 0.073 0.168 0.554 0.183 0.109 0.155 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS cohort 
 
 
There are several potential reasons why this procedure predicts actual 
probabilities poorly.  One reason is the simplistic first-order Markov assumption that 
underlies the predictions. State dependence may be more complicated; the value in wave t 
may depend on the value not only in wave t-1, but on prior waves as well.  A second 
reason is heterogeneity. If there are two populations, for instance, one intrinsically 
healthier than the other, the transition probability averaged over both subpopulations will 
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underestimate the proportion in good health after eight years and will overestimate the 
proportion in fair or poor health after 8 years.  Below, we show descriptive evidence of 
both state dependence and heterogeneity.  A third reason is measurement error, in this 
case misclassification of a respondent into the wrong categorical health status.  We will 
also show descriptive evidence of this problem below. 
To demonstrate that that health outcomes in wave 3 depend on health in wave 1 as 
well as wave 2, we show in Table 4-3 a complete “tree” of health status probabilities in 
waves 1, 2, and 3.  These probabilities are based on 513 men who were aged 51 in wave 
1.  The first column (wave 1) simply shows the proportions in good and poor health at 
wave 1.  Column 2 (wave 2) shows the distribution of health status in wave 2, given 
health status in wave 1.  The third column (wave 3) shows the evidence on state 
dependence.  Health in wave 3 depends not only on health in wave 2, but also on health 
in wave 1.  For example, 91.25 percent of men who are in good health in wave 2 and in 
wave 1 are in good health in wave 3.  But only 61.54 percent of men who are in good 
health in wave 2 and in fair health in wave 1 are in good health in wave 3.  Also, 36.84 
percent of men who are in good health in wave 1 and in fair health in wave 2 are in fair 
health in wave 3.  On the other hand, 59.46 percent of men who are in fair health in both 
wave 1 and in wave 2 have a fair health in wave 3. That is, health status in wave 3 
depends not only on health in the preceding wave 2, but also on health in the prior wave 
3.   Thus a second-order Markov process would describe these transitions much better 
than a first-order Markov process. 
Table 4-3: Health transitions in the first three waves of the HRS 
cohort, for men age 51 in wave 1 
wave 1 wave 2 wave 3 
Good + 82.32 Good + 87.35 Good + 91.25 
    Poor/Fair 5.05 
    Dead 0.67 
     Attrition 3.03 
  Poor/Fair 5.59 Good + 47.37 
    Poor/Fair 36.84 
    Dead 5.26 
     Attrition 10.53 
  Dead 0.29   
   Attrition 6.76    
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Poor/Fair 17.68 Good + 35.62 Good + 61.54 
    Poor/Fair 26.92 
    Dead 3.85 
     Attrition 7.69 
  Poor/Fair 50.68 Good + 18.92 
    Poor/Fair 59.46 
    Dead 13.51 
     Attrition 8.11 
  Dead 9.59   
   Attrition 4.11    
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort 
 
 
The underlying reason for such state dependence may, however, be population 
heterogeneity. Indeed Table 4-4 shows the results of a regression of change of health 
status between each pair of successive waves on a host of individual characteristics in the 
first of the two waves.  The table shows that the individual characteristics of a substantial 
effect on the transition.  Thus substantial heterogeneity is attributable to observed 
individual characteristics, suggesting substantial heterogeneity over unobserved 
characteristics as well. The marital status is interacted with gender; the reference group is 
married males.  Particularly striking are the estimated coefficients on the upper and lower 
wealth and income quartiles. They indicate a significantly lower probability of remaining 
in poor health if a person is in the top wealth quartile or in the top income quartile. 
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Table 4-4: Regression of health in second  of two waves based on observable characteristics in first wave 
                Wave 1=>2                Wave 2=>3              Wave 3=>4           Wave 4=>5 Attribute in the first 
of the two waves Health 
poor/fair dead attrition 
Health 
poor/fair dead attrition 
Health 
poor/fair dead attrition 
Health 
poor/fair dead attrition 
Fair or poor health 2.894** 2.948** 1.029** 2.865** 2.917** 1.194** 2.933** 2.982** 0.557** 2.728** 2.672** -0.483** 
 (41.23) (16.26) (8.40) (39.94) (16.68) (9.10) (39.20) (17.68) (4.02) (37.95) (16.39) (3.48) 
Age 0.026* 0.099** -0.020 0.009 0.042+ -0.040* -0.009 0.074** -0.016 0.009 0.076** -0.032* 
 (2.47) (3.67) (1.35) (0.86) (1.67) (2.39) (0.89) (2.92) (1.15) (0.84) (3.19) (2.48) 
Single male -0.047 0.030 -0.059 -0.083 0.607* -0.184 -0.056 -0.278 -0.168 -0.068 0.187 -0.063 
 (0.35) (0.10) (0.32) (0.57) (2.43) (0.81) (0.39) (0.85) (0.89) (0.45) (0.71) (0.37) 
Single female -0.235* -0.644** -0.574** -0.195+ -0.564* -0.799** -0.066 -0.334 -0.357* -0.330** -0.729** -0.403** 
 (2.33) (2.71) (3.71) (1.86) (2.36) (4.16) (0.64) (1.42) (2.51) (3.02) (3.17) (3.08) 
Married female -0.133+ -0.932** -0.268* -0.086 -0.962** -0.196+ -0.077 -0.462* -0.151 -0.156+ -0.670** -0.189* 
 (1.71) (4.22) (2.45) (1.09) (4.46) (1.68) (1.01) (2.43) (1.53) (1.91) (3.58) (2.06) 
1 child 0.139 0.813+ -0.346 0.229 0.099 0.044 0.102 0.240 -0.007 0.195 -0.327 0.039 
 (0.84) (1.88) (1.64) (1.33) (0.26) (0.17) (0.60) (0.61) (0.03) (1.06) (0.92) (0.20) 
2 children -0.176 0.246 -0.525** 0.017 0.160 -0.149 0.008 -0.215 -0.238 0.161 -0.276 -0.217 
 (1.23) (0.61) (3.04) (0.12) (0.50) (0.67) (0.06) (0.60) (1.32) (1.01) (0.95) (1.32) 
3 or more children 0.114 0.651+ -0.631** 0.046 0.103 -0.197 0.125 0.164 -0.224 0.245+ -0.238 -0.196 
 (0.86) (1.76) (3.95) (0.33) (0.35) (0.93) (0.92) (0.52) (1.33) (1.66) (0.91) (1.27) 
1st wealth quartile 0.524** 0.748** 0.471** 0.442** 0.179 0.064 0.450** 0.481* 0.540** 0.417** 0.208 0.652** 
 (6.57) (3.70) (3.91) (5.29) (0.92) (0.44) (5.46) (2.54) (4.85) (4.80) (1.14) (6.30) 
4th wealth quartile -0.448** 0.144 0.106 -0.308** -0.005 0.091 -0.359** -0.500+ -0.101 -0.449** -0.512* -0.046 
 (4.49) (0.57) (0.86) (3.08) (0.02) (0.69) (3.86) (1.95) (0.88) (4.38) (2.18) (0.44) 
1st income quartile 0.601** 0.708** 0.508** 0.481** 0.474* 0.414** 0.525** 0.300 0.128 0.582** 0.794** 0.463** 
 (7.43) (3.48) (4.20) (5.65) (2.43) (2.95) (6.26) (1.53) (1.09) (6.58) (4.29) (4.35) 
4th income quartile -0.474** -0.203 -0.242+ -0.305** -0.318 -0.255+ -0.343** -0.348 -0.408** -0.395** 0.005 -0.188+ 
 (4.53) (0.72) (1.86) (2.98) (1.22) (1.83) (3.64) (1.38) (3.47) (3.81) (0.02) (1.77) 
Constant -3.691** -10.749** -1.068 -2.846** -6.757** -0.407 -1.445* -8.253** -1.037 -2.897** -8.102** -0.033 
  (6.13) (6.84) (1.26) (4.59) (4.64) (0.43) (2.40) (5.58) (1.32) (4.53) (5.89) (0.05) 
Observations 9024   8355   8044   7724   
Log Likelihood 
-
5588.88   
-
5146.94   -5814.33   -5702.05   
Pseudo-R2 0.23     0.22     0.20     0.20     
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses          
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the HRS cohort 
 
  Page 24 of 54 
To see whether these covariates improve the long-run predictive power of the 2-year 
transitions, we use the predicted transition probabilities to project health status in 2000, 
beginning with health status in 1992. One such specification is shown in Table 4-4.  We 
again compare the predicted probabilities of the outcomes in 2000 with the actual 
probabilities.  We are interested in how much closer the predicted probabilities are to the 
actual probabilities when a more individual attributes in the first wave are controlled for, 
in addition to health status in the first of the two waves.  We used three specifications: 
• Specification (1) includes only age and gender, 
• Specification (2) is the one shown in Table 4-4,  
• Specification (3) refines the description of health by adding to specification (2) 
the RAND summary indices for the number of conditions, and indices of gross 
and fine motor activities and mobility which significantly correlate with disability 
as shown in Table 2-2.   
 
Table 4-5: Prediction of 1992-2000 health changes, controlling for 
observable characteristics 
 
   Wave 5 health 
                     Actual             Simulated 
Specification "fit" initial health good+ 
poor/ 
fair dead attrition good+ 
poor/ 
fair dead attrition 
(1) 0.413 good+ 67.12 11.13 4.83 16.92 60.47 16.77 5.88 16.89 
  poor/fair 20.50 43.99 19.85 15.66 43.81 24.26 16.16 15.76 
           
(2) 0.436 good+ 67.12 11.14 4.83 16.91 61.88 15.58 5.64 16.91 
  poor/fair 20.51 44.01 19.86 15.62 38.89 28.48 17.01 15.62 
           
(3) 0.469 good+ 67.17 11.10 4.82 16.91 64.95 13.07 4.89 17.09 
  poor/fair 20.56 44.07 19.71 15.66 29.06 36.67 19.28 15.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations base on the HRS cohort.  Note: The slight differences in the actual 
distributions are due to missing values for some of the covariates. 
 
Controlling for initial values of covariates improves the predictions substantially. 
Still, even specification (3) understates the proportion of persons who were in poor of fair 
health in 1992 who are in poor or fair health in 2000.  While 44.07 percent of these 
persons are in poor or fair health in 2000, the predicted percent is only 36.67 percent.  
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However, specification (3) does much better than specification (1) or specification (2), 
that control for fewer individual attributes.  Specification (3) also predicts much better 
than specification (1) or (2) the percent of persons who were in good or better health in 
1992 who are in good or better health in 2000.  The improvement in “fit”, displayed in 
the second column of Table 4-5, is measured by the average simulated probability of the 
observed outcome.  Thus better control for individual heterogeneity improves the 
transition predictions substantially. 
Finally, we consider misclassification error.  We assume that underlying health 
(or disability) is continuous, ranging from persons with the worst health to those with the 
best health.  The measure of health status reported in the HRS, however, is discrete, 
allowing for 5 self-reported categories (which we often condense even further into only 
two categories).  Measured disability allows for only two categories.  These categories 
are not precisely defined. Respondents may therefore “misclassify” their health or 
disability status because they report a different category than others who have the same 
underlying health status. 
Misclassifications are likely to be particularly frequent in situations in which true 
underlying health status is on the borderline between categories. This may explain 
sequences which exhibit a frequent back and forth movement from one category to the 
other (such as 01010 in the binary disability categories). Another type of misclassification 
is simple error.  Sequences which show a single deviation from an otherwise constant 
pattern (such as 00100) may reflect such errors, although they may also indicate a 
temporary illness, for example. 
Table 4-6 shows the frequencies of each sequence of self-reported health in the 
HRS data. In each of the five waves between 1992 and 2000, “0” represents good or 
better health, “1” fair or poor health, and “x” either death or attrition. The sequences are 
ordered in descending frequency. The most striking feature of the data is the stability of 
self-reported health status.  Almost 45 percent of all respondents reported that their health 
was good or better in all five waves.  Another 6.4 percent reported that their health was 
fair or poor in all five waves.  Including incomplete histories (noted by x), 71.3 percent of 
respondents never changed their self-reported health status.  Another 13.7 percent 
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changed their self-reported health status only once, mostly from good or better to fair or 
poor. 
Self-reported health sequences with changes from good or better to fair or poor, or 
the reverse, are relatively rare.   Thus these data provide prima facie evidence suggesting 
that misclassification cannot dominate self-reported health categorization.  Self-reported 
sequences with three or four changes make up only 3.7 percent of all sequences.  Single-
change sequences are more frequent, accounting for 6.6 percent of all sequences.  And it 
is not clear how many of these reflect true one-spell illnesses.  Thus we should perhaps be 
less concerned about errors in the data than about the reduction in information inherent in 
the discrete coding of an underlying continuous variable. 
Table 4-6: Sequences of health status, 1992-2000 
 
Sequence Freq. Percent Cum.  Sequence Freq. Percent Cum.   Sequence Freq. Percent Cum.
00000 4048 44.84 44.8  11110 67 0.74 88.2  10xxx 27 0.30 97.3 
11111 578 6.40 51.2  10111 61 0.68 88.9  010xx 25 0.28 97.6 
0xxxx 449 4.97 56.2  11000 56 0.62 89.5  10100 23 0.25 97.8 
00xxx 327 3.62 59.8  01011 51 0.56 90.1  10110 23 0.25 98.1 
000xx 267 2.96 62.8  11010 51 0.56 90.7  0111x 21 0.23 98.3 
00010 257 2.85 65.6  01110 48 0.53 91.2  101xx 20 0.22 98.5 
00001 243 2.69 68.3  10011 48 0.53 91.7  0011x 18 0.20 98.7 
1xxxx 221 2.45 70.8  11101 45 0.50 92.2  110xx 17 0.19 98.9 
0000x 211 2.34 73.1  01010 41 0.45 92.7  1001x 16 0.18 99.1 
00011 144 1.60 74.7  00101 40 0.44 93.1  10101 16 0.18 99.3 
11xxx 143 1.58 76.3  001xx 39 0.43 93.5  1000x 13 0.14 99.4 
10000 128 1.42 77.7  0001x 38 0.42 94.0  1011x 10 0.11 99.5 
01111 126 1.40 79.1  10010 33 0.37 94.3  0110x 8 0.09 99.6 
00111 120 1.33 80.5  11001 33 0.37 94.7  1101x 8 0.09 99.7 
01000 113 1.25 81.7  10001 32 0.35 95.1  0100x 7 0.08 99.8 
00100 103 1.14 82.8  01001 31 0.34 95.4  0010x 5 0.06 99.8 
111xx 101 1.12 84.0  11100 30 0.33 95.7  1110x 5 0.06 99.9 
1111x 96 1.06 85.0  01100 29 0.32 96.0  1100x 4 0.04 99.9 
01xxx 80 0.89 85.9  011xx 29 0.32 96.4  0101x 3 0.03 100.0
00110 75 0.83 86.7  01101 27 0.30 97.0  1010x 3 0.03 100.0
11011 69 0.76 87.5           
Total            9028 100  
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS cohort 
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The sequences also provide some information that helps to distinguish true state 
dependence from unobserved heterogeneity.  We calculate the probability of a bad health 
state in wave 5, conditional on a sequence in the first four waves of the HRS.  The data 
are reported in Table 4-7.  In this representation, we assume that heterogeneity is held 
constant by conditioning on the total number of past bad health states, regardless of order. 
State dependence in this representation is suggested if the sequence of past health states 
determines health status in wave 5, but the number of past bad health states does 
determine health status in wave 5. 
Thus we order the entries in the table first by the number of bad health states, and 
then by the number of waves over which the most recent health state was observed 
without change.  Not surprisingly, the probability of being in bad health in wave 5 
increases with the number of prior bad states.  In addition, there is also a distinct time lag 
effect: the more recent a bad health status the higher the probability of being in bad health 
in wave 5. 
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Table 4-7: Probability of bad health in wave 5, conditional on sequence of 
health states in waves 1 through 4 
 
Number 
 
Initial sequence in 
waves 1 through 4 
Frequency 
of initial 
sequence 
Number 
of past 
bad 
health 
states 
Lag since 
last bad 
health 
state 
Probability 
of bad health 
in wave 5 
1 0000 5,572 0 - 0.06 
2 1000 209 1 4 0.19 
3 0100 185 1 3 0.21 
4 0010 183 1 2 0.28 
5 0001 538 1 1 0.38 
6 1100 110 2 3 0.38 
7 1010 46 2 2 0.39 
8 0110 75 2 2 0.51 
9 0101 125 2 1 0.55 
10 1001 108 2 1 0.61 
11 0011 249 2 1 0.61 
12 1110 93 3 2 0.58 
13 1101 157 3 1 0.61 
14 0111 216 3 1 0.73 
15 1011 106 3 1 0.73 
16 1111 799 4 1 0.90 
 Total 8,771   0.25 
Source: Authors’ calculations from HRS cohort 
 
 
Comparing sequence 1 to sequence 2, we see clearly that even health status fives 
waves earlier affects health status in wave 5.  With no prior bad health states, the 
probability of bad health in wave 5 is 0.06; if the only change is that health status 5 waves 
earlier is bad (but good in the subsequent 3 waves), the probability of bad health in wave 
5 is increased from 0.06 to 0.19.   This change suggests heterogeneity.  The comparison 
of sequences 3 with 6 tells the same story.  So does the comparison of sequences 4 and 7. 
Comparison of sequences 2, 3, and 4 shows that, holding the number of past bad 
health states constant, the more recent the bad health state the greater the probability that 
health status in wave 5 will be bad.  This suggests state dependence.  Obviously, there is 
more going on than simple heterogeneity.  State dependence may overlay differences in 
self-reported health status due to heterogeneity.  Similar conclusions follow from 
comparing sequence 6 to sequence 7, and sequence 7 to sequence 8.  In each sequence, 
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there are two bad health states.  But the more recent the last of these bad health states, the 
greater the probability that health status in wave 5 will be bad.  One explanation for this 
“state dependence” is a drift in the underlying continuous health variable that underlies 
our coarse binary health indicator.  We will return to this issue in our more refined model 
in Section 5. 
The number of bad health states (as a measure of heterogeneity) and the number 
of waves since the last bad health state (as a measure of state dependence) are close to a 
sufficient statistic for the initial sequences.   The probability of bad health in wave 5 is 
very closely approximated by these two measures.  Table 4-8 shows logit regression 
estimates of health status in wave five regressed on these two measures (based on the first 
4 waves).  This specification cannot be rejected versus a specification with a full set of 
dummies for the 16 sequences in Table 4-7 (p=0.5409).  
 
Table 4-8: Probability of bad health in wave 5 based on summary 
measures of health status in the prior 4 waves 
 
Logit estimates Odds Ratio Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
# bad states=0 1.00 (reference) 
# bad states=1 4.06 0.50 11.29 0.00 
# bad states=2 8.40 1.61 11.11 0.00 
# bad states=3 11.92 3.17 9.33 0.00 
# bad states=4 39.24 13.18 10.93 0.00 
status w1 = bad 1.00 (reference) 
status w2 = bad 1.06 0.15 0.43 0.67 
status w3 = bad 1.44 0.17 2.99 0.00 
status w4 = bad 2.24 0.26 6.85 0.00 
     
Number of obs 
Log 
likelihood LR chi2(7) Pseudo R2 Prob > chi2 
8771 -3049.0437 3698.25 0.3775 0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the HRS cohort 
 
 Table 4-9 shows the “fitted” probabilities of bad health in wave 5 based on the 
regression above, together with the actual probabilities, for each of the sequences in 
Table 4-7.  It is clear that the fitted values are close to the actual values. 
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Table 4-9: Predicted versus actual 
probability of health status in wave 5 
 
Sequence 
In waves 1-4 Actual Predicted 
0000 0.061 0.061 
0001 0.385 0.372 
0010 0.279 0.276 
0011 0.606 0.638 
0100 0.205 0.219 
0101 0.552 0.565 
0110 0.507 0.455 
0111 0.731 0.727 
1000 0.187 0.209 
1001 0.611 0.551 
1010 0.391 0.441 
1011 0.726 0.715 
1100 0.382 0.367 
1101 0.611 0.649 
1110 0.581 0.542 
1111 0.897 0.897 
Total 0.246 0.246 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HRS cohort 
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5.  An econometric model based on continuous latent 
(“hidden”) health status 
The descriptive analysis presented in section 4 suggests that self-reported health 
status in all waves prior to wave 5, contains information about wave 5 health status.  That 
is health status in wave 5 depends on health status in all prior waves. There are at least 
three explanations for this: 
• State dependence:  past health states directly affect the risk of a current (good or 
bad) state. 
• Heterogeneity:  past states contain information on individual-specific risk that is 
correlated over time. 
• Misclassification:  categorical coding induces error in self-reported health status. 
Thus to predict future health status, we use an econometric model that accounts for each 
of these features of the data.5 The key idea is to model “true” underlying health status as 
a  continuous “latent” variable.  The categorical self-assessed indicators of health (or 
work disability) are determined by this latent health. The underlying continuous latent 
health variable is correlated over time and thus induces correlation over time in the 
observed responses to the categorical self-assessment of health status and disability.  In 
addition, the probability of death is assumed to depend on the “hidden” health measure, 
thus allowing for correlation between health status and selection into the group of persons 
who survive from one period to the next.  The key features of the specification are 
illustrated in Figure 5-1. It relates a categorical self-assessed health indicator y to “true” 
latent health h and a set of observed covariates x. 
                                                 
5 Details can be found in Heiss (2005, Ch. 3). 
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Figure 5-1: Modeling a hidden health process 
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The diagram describes the evolution of latent heath, the measured health 
indicators y , and mortality m over time—in periods 0, 1, 2,  and so forth.  Latent health h 
depends on observed individual covariates x and on unobserved individual attributes a , 
which are correlated over time.  In addition to the random unobserved variable a , which 
directly influences h , self-reported health or disability y , and mortality, depend on two 
additional stochastic shocks.  One shocku represents classification error in self reported 
health as well as unmeasured variables that affect self-reported health.  Another shock 
e reflects unobserved determinants of mortality.   
More precisely, the model used to describe health (or disability) transitions and 
mortality is represented by the following equations: 
(1)  Latent “hidden” health:  
 iw iw iwh x aγ= +  
 (2)  Unobserved determinants of latent health (heterogeneity):  
( )
( )( )
2
( ) ( 1) 2 2( ( ) ( 1))
1 1
0,
| , 1
iw a
t w t w t w t w
iw iw iw a
a N
a a N a
σ
ρ σ ρ− − − −− − −
?
?
 
(3)  Categorical self-reported health measure y :  
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1
1
Pr | ,iw iw iw y iw iw y iw iw
y iw iw iw y iw iw iw
y y x h h x h x
x a x x a x
α β α β
α γ β α γ β
−
−
= = Λ − − −Λ − −
= Λ − + − −Λ − + −  
(4)  Mortality hazard rate:  
( )
( )( )
( ) exp
exp
it w iw
iw iw
h
x a
λ α δ
α δ γ
= +
= + +   
(5)  Survival probability from HRS wave 1w− to wave w :  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( 1)
1
( ) | ( 1) exp ( ) ( 1) it w it wi
iw iw
S t w t w t w t w
h h
λ λ
δ
−
−
⎛ ⎞−− = − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 
Equation 1 describes the key latent health variable. Latent health of individual i in 
wave w is determined by two components: a deterministic part that is a function of the 
explanatory variables xiw, and an unobserved component aiw which persists from period to 
period and provides for heterogeneity among respondents.  The persistence of the 
unobserved determinant of latent health is described in equation 2.  The aiw follow a first-
order autoregressive process defined in continuous time.6 The marginal distribution of aiw 
is normal with zero mean and variance σ2. Conditional on a previous realization d time 
units ago, where d may be continuous, its distribution is normal with mean ρdaiw-d and 
variance σ2(1- ρ2d).  (Simpler specifications (such as independent realizations or random 
effects) can be specified as special cases of equation 2.) 
The observed categorical self-reported health or work disability responses are 
determined by the ordered logit functional form described in equation 3.  The logit 
probabilities depend on the covariates iwx and by the latent health measure h --which in 
turn is also a function of the measured covariates xiw and the unobserved 
determinant iwa of latent health (equation 1)--and by transitory shocks iwu which are 
independent and follow a logistic distribution.  Λ(·) is the cumulative distribution 
function (c.d.f.) of the logistic distribution, with α0 = -∞ and α5 = ∞.  The threshold 
parameters α1 through α4 are “cut-off” values of latent health that indicate the switch 
                                                 
6 An “Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.” 
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points from one categorical response y to another.  They are estimated in the model. In 
the case of a binary specification, equation 3 reduces to a simple logit model.  Notice that 
from equation 3 alone, both of the parameters γ and β cannot be identified.  But 
mortality depends only on the covariates x through latent health and thus allows separate 
identification ofγ , as described next.   
Equations 4 and 5 describe the mortality process that induces sample selection, 
distinguishing persons who remain in the sample from those who die and leave the 
sample. We start with a straightforward formulation of the mortality hazard rate (equation 
4) which depends only on latent health iwh .  We then use an approximation formula to 
integrate this expression over time to obtain the survival function (equation 5).  The 
parameters α and δ are estimated. 
The underlying health process and the selection process due to mortality are 
obviously related.  The health change of a typical respondent between two waves is 
confounded by the fact that this comparison is possible only for the relatively healthy 
who survive from one wave to the next.  A similar problem arises for example when 
back-casting the health at age 50 of a respondent who was interviewed at age 80.  The 
fact that a person survived until 80 tells us that he was probably healthier that the average 
respondent at age 50.   
In our model, the correlation between health and mortality is generated through 
latent health h ,which in turn depends on observed covariates x as well as the unobserved 
component of latent health a .  So conditional on the covariates x , mortality risk and 
health are allowed to be correlated through a .  In order to identify the model, we assume 
that conditional on the covariates and the unobserved determinants of latent health, the 
self-reported health measures and mortality are independent.  Hence, once we know the 
covariates x  and latent health h , there is no additional information in the self-reported 
health measures of an individual that we could use to make a better prediction of the 
individual’s life expectancy.  Our core identifying assumption is that all such information 
is contained in the latent health variable. 
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The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. Conditional on the 
sequence of unobserved persistent health shocks aiw, all calculations are straightforward –
the probabilities of self-reported health are given in equation (3) and the 
survival/mortality probabilities are given in equations (4) and (5). We then integrate over 
the sequence of health shocks aiw using Monte-Carlo simulation. Their joint distribution 
is given by equation (2). We account for the fact that selectivity through mortality has 
gone on before the first wave by integrating not over the unconditional distribution of aiw 
but over the distribution conditional on survival up to the first interview – see Figure 6-3 
below. 
This method results in asymptotically efficient parameter estimates if certain 
regularity conditions hold and the number of replications rises fast enough with the 
number of individuals. For details on these simulation methods see Hajivassiliou and 
Ruud (1994). Alternative simulation schemes for this and similar models such as 
nonlinear filtering are discussed by Heiss (2006). 
 
6.  Results 
We have estimated the different joint model of the health status and mortality on 
the first six waves (1992-2002) of the HRS (using all four cohorts).  As discussed above, 
the health outcomes we consider are the five categories of self-reported health (SRH) and 
the two categories of work disability (WD). 
In a first model, the only covariates included are age splines. They enter the latent 
health equation and the SRH/WD outcome equations. The parameters in the latent health 
equation are identified by the fact that age does not separately enter the mortality 
equation and that latent health enters the outcome equations with a normalized weight of 
1.  
Table 6-1 presents the estimation results for the SRH and WD outcomes.  The 
unobserved heterogeneity (the standard deviation of a ) is substantial.  The standard 
deviation of a is estimated to be 3.2 in the SRH model and 4.7 in the WD model. The 
correlation of a over time is close to 1 in both models, although significantly less than 1. 
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The estimated correlation over one year translates into a correlation between values 20 
years apart of 0.7 in the SRH model and 0.5 in the WD model.  Consequently, the 
hypothesis of no heterogeneity ( 0σ = ) and the random effects hypothesis ( 1ρ = ) are 
rejected.  Results from these models can be requested from the authors.7    
  
Table 6-1: Estimation results with age only 
  Self-reported health Work disability 
  Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err. 
Latent Health (h):     
Std. dev. of a (σ) 3.2411 0.0153 4.6886 0.0429 
1-year correlation of a (ρ) 0.9817 0.0006 0.9663 0.0005 
Covariates (γ): Age -0.5908 0.0425 -0.4644 0.0141 
Age spline 60+ 0.3012 0.0573 0.1424 0.0303 
Age spline 70+ -0.0128 0.0443 -0.0436 0.0394 
Age spline 80+ -0.2429 0.0390 -0.2841 0.0382 
Age spline 90+ -0.0974 0.0501 -0.0771 0.0539 
Health measure (y):     
Latent health (enters with weight normalized to 1) 
Covariates (β): Age 0.4610 0.0434 -0.2421 0.0162 
Age spline 60+ -0.2504 0.0573 0.0627 0.0299 
Age spline 70+ -0.0694 0.0431 0.0631 0.0383 
Age spline 80+ 0.1837 0.0374 -0.0701 0.0381 
Age spline 90+ 0.0325 0.0496 0.0202 0.0580 
other 
4 ordered logit cut 
points constant 
Mortality (m):     
Baseline (α) -6.8642 0.0846 -8.0584 0.0905 
Latent health (δ) -1.0721 0.0163 -0.4387 0.0055 
\# individuals 25,497  25,050  
\# observations (health) 103,250  88,798  
\# parameters 18  15  
Log-Likelihood -150,438.0   -60,269.9   
 
 
6.1  Simulations with age only 
Given the parameter estimates for self-reported health (SRH) and work disability 
(WD) shown in Table 6-1, we can simulate future paths of survival and health (and 
                                                 
7 The transitory shocks u in the categorical health equations are normalized to 1.8
3
≈π , as is implicit in 
the logit model. 
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disability) conditional on health earlier in life. This is done by simulating not over the 
unconditional distribution of latent health shocks a but over the distributions conditional 
on survival or observed health outcomes. Figure 6-3 below presents such conditional 
distributions for survival up to different ages.    
The simulated survival rates conditional on survival up to age 50 for the whole 
population is shown and compared with the life tables for 1997 (National Center for 
Health Statistics: National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 47, No. 28) in Figure 6-1.  Our 
simulated survival probabilities tend to be slightly higher than the numbers from the life 
tables. This might be because the HRS samples only individuals who are initially non-
institutionalized. 
 
Figure 6-1: Survival probabilities – simulation vs. life tables 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
50 60 70 80 90 100
age
su
rv
iv
al
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
life tables 1997
simulation
 
 
Both health and disability are strongly related to mortality, as shown in Figure 6-
2.  The figure shows this relationship by comparing future survival probabilities 
conditional on self-reported health (or disability) at age of 50. The differences are 
striking. For example, only 48.5 percent of respondents who report poor health at age 50 
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survive until age 70, whereas 91.6 percent of those reporting excellent health at age 50 
survive until age 70.  A similar pattern is revealed with respect to work disability. 
 
Figure 6-2: Survival probabilities 
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The two lines for each series represent the inner and outer 95% confidence bands. 
 
Two technical aspects of Figure 6-2 are worth mentioning. First, the inner and 
outer 95% confidence bands represented by the two lines for each of the three simulations 
are very close to each other, indicating a rather precise fit. We therefore will not show 
confidence bands in the sequel of this paper. Second and as shown in Figure 6-1, the 
unconditional simulation is not significantly different from the actual life tables. 
Figure 6-3 illustrates the selection effect induced by differential mortality.  The 
figure shows the distribution of the unobserved component a of latent health given 
survival to selected ages.   (These are weighted kernel density estimates and are scaled by 
survival probabilities, so that the curves integrate to the share of surviving population at 
the respective ages.)  Those who are in the left part of the distributions with relatively 
poor latent health are more likely to be selected out, so the distribution shifts to the right 
with the survival age.   
Figure 6-3: Distribution of unobserved health given survival to selected ages 
(a) SRH model (b) Work disability model 
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To simplify the presentation of simulated paths of health (or disability) we 
collapse the 5-point scale of self-reported health into two groups—good or better and fair 
or poor.   Figure 6-4 shows three different health or disability paths.  Figure 6-4a pertains 
to the proportion of the population in fair or poor health, from age 50 to age 100.  Figure 
6-4b pertains to the proportion of the population that reports a work disability.  The path 
labelled “unconditional path” shows the hypothetical path of fair or poor health (or work 
disability) if there were no deaths, or perhaps more meaningful, it shows the path of poor 
health in the surviving population if poor health and mortality were independent.  
Because persons in poor health have a much higher mortality rate than persons in good 
health, health of the surviving population is much better than the hypothetical health 
shown by the “unconditional path.”  The path labelled “survivors” shows poor health 
among persons who survive to a given age.  The difference between the unconditional 
path and the survivor path represents the selection effect—persons in poor health are 
more likely to die and thus are less likely to be in the sample at older ages. 
Figure 6-4 also shows the actual proportion of persons in poor health (or 
disabled), based on self-reported health (or disability) responses among persons of a 
given age in the HRS.   The survey of course can only interview survivors.  The path 
determined by the actual response at each age is also shown in the figure.  If the model 
represents an appropriate description of poor health and mortality, and their dependence, 
the simulated poor health path for the surviving population should correspond closely to 
the actual self-reported poor health levels of persons who survived to a given age.   
Figure 6-4 shows that the two paths correspond very closely for both poor health and for 
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work disability.  Only at very old ages do the two paths diverge noticeably.  The actual 
data at these older ages is very sparse, however. 
 
Figure 6-4: Paths of health measures and the selection effect 
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Because of the mortality selection, the survival of a respondent provides 
information about the person’s health at younger ages.  The model can be used to 
simulate the health status at earlier ages of persons who survive to a given age.  Figure 6-
5 shows the simulated evolution of health (or disability), conditional on survival to at 
least age 80, or to at least age 90. Because of the strong relationship between health and 
mortality and the large inter-temporal correlation of health, the two conditional paths 
differ substantially.  To understand the relationship, consider the four poor health paths 
shown in Figure 6-5.  The unconditional path and the survivor path are the same as those 
shown in Figure 6-4.   The proportion of all persons that is in poor  or fair health at age 
50 is about 0.18, as shown by the “survivors” path.   The proportion of persons who are in 
poor health at age 50 among those who will survive until age 80 is about 0.09. Of those 
who survive until age 90, the proportion in bad health at age 50 is only about 0.06.  The 
proportions with respect to disability are similar to those for health--about 0.16, 0.08, and 
0.05 respectively.  
Perhaps more striking is the comparison of health at age 80 of persons who 
survive until at least 80 with the health at age 80 of those who survive until at least 90.  
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At age 80, about 40 percent of persons who survive until at least 80 are in poor health.  
On the other hand, only about 20 percent of persons who survive until at least age 90 are 
in poor health at age 80.   A comparable comparison for disability shows similar values.    
The model could also be used to simulate more detailed information about the 
health status at younger ages of persons who survive to a given age, like the distribution 
over all health states at age 50. 
Figure 6-5: Health paths conditional on survival to age 80 and 90 
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What does self-reported health status tell us about underlying latent health?  
Figure 6-6 shows the distribution of latent health at age 50, given self reported health at 
age 50.  The distribution of latent health is very different, depending on self reported 
health status.   Figure 6-6a shows the distribution of latent health for persons who 
reported they were in poor health and for persons who reported they were in excellent 
health.  These distributions hardly overlap.  The different distributions, together with the 
high persistence of latent health over time, generate substantial persistence of  health 
outcomes.  
The distributions conditional on disability are somewhat different.  The 
distribution of latent health for persons who report a work disability at age 50 is clearly 
over the left tail of the distribution of latent health for all persons at age 50.  But knowing 
that a person reports no disability at age 50, provides only limited information to 
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distinguish this group from all persons at age 50.  The distribution of latent health for the 
no-disability group is only slightly to the right of the distribution of latent health for all 
persons.  The reason is that at age 50 most respondents classify themselves in the no-
disability group, and thus there can be little difference between the no-disability group 
and all respondents.   
Figure 6-6: Distribution of latent health at age 50 
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Figure 6-7 shows future health (and disability) conditional on self reported health 
at age 50.  Conditional on self-reported health, two paths are shown—one for all persons 
that does not account for selection due to mortality, and one for survivors.  Figure 6-7a 
shows the proportion in poor or fair health.  Figure 6-7b shows the proportion with a 
work disability.   Note that because of self-reported classification errors, the health path 
for those who report they are in poor health at age 50 does not start at zero.  And the path 
for those who say they are in excellent health does not start at 1.  Similar explanation 
pertains to the work disability paths.   
Self-reported health is highly persistent—the two paths converge only slowly.   
Consider the two survivor paths.   Until the age 70 or 80 the two paths remain far apart.  
The paths only start to converge rapidly after age 90.  For persons surviving until age 100 
the mortality selection effect leaves survivors with approximately the same health status 
at age 100, no matter what there reported health status at age 50.   (The selection effect is 
much less pronounced for persons with excellent initial health.  The paths of the total and 
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the surviving population diverge more slowly for this group than for the group with poor 
reported health at age 50.)  For work disability, the results are similar.  Persistence with 
respect to disability, however, is not as strong as persistence with respect to poor versus 
excellent health.  This is because poor and excellent health at age 50 are very distinct 
outcomes, which contain significant information about latent health, as shown in Figure 
6-6.  Work disability versus no work disability contains less information, also shown in 
Figure 6-6. 
Figure 6-7: Health paths by initial health at age 50 
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Figure 6-8, instead of showing the future path of persons conditional on reported 
health at age 50 (as in Figure 6-7), shows the reverse paths for persons who survive until 
at least age 80 and report their health status at age 80.  The pure information about health 
provided by survival through age 80 is shown in Figure 6-5 above.  Conditioning on 
reported health at age 80 obviously also conditions on survival to at least age 80.  
Survival to age 80 and health status at age 80 may provide countervailing information, 
however.  Survival is good news; bad health is bad news.   Bad self-reported poor health 
at age 80 outweighs the good information on survival through age 80.  “Back-casting” 
SRH from age 80 to age 50, the unconditional poor health risk at 50 is 17.8 percent.  
Conditional on survival to age 80, the likelihood of poor health decreases to 10.0 percent.  
Of those who survive until age 80 and report poor health at age 80, 20.3 percent are 
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simulated to be in poor or fair health at age 50.  Of those who survive to age 80 and 
report excellent health at age 80, only 2.1 percent are predicted to be in poor or fair health 
at age 50. 
On the other hand, information about work disability at age 80, given survival to 
at least age 80, provides little information about disability status at age 50, as suggested 
by Figure 6-6 above.  
Figure 6-8: Health paths by initial health at age 80 
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7.2  Simulations:  Conditioning on Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
In addition to the model in which we only conditioned on age, we estimate a 
model for SRH with additional covariates--gender, race, and education and interactions of 
these variables with age--in the latent health and the self-reported health outcome 
equations. Table 6-2 shows the parameter estimates. Remember that the covariates enter 
the latent health and the SRH equation. Therefore, the former capture the effects on 
mortality, the latter the additional effects on SRH. Females have a higher latent health (a 
lower mortality risk) at age 50 and this effect increases at higher ages.8 On the other 
hand, given latent health (mortality risk), their SRH response is much worse. This might 
                                                 
8 The variable “age” is actual age minus 50. 
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be due to different response scales or different health conditions that affect subjective 
health more than mortality such as arthritis. Respondents have a higher latent health and 
report better SRH given latent health. 
Table 6-2: Estimation results with age and sociodemographics 
  Latent health (h) SRH 
  Estimate Std.err. Estimate Std.err. 
Latent Health (h):     
Std. dev. of a (σ) 2.9894 0.0386   
1-year correlation of a 
(ρ) 0.9787 0.0006   
Covariates (γ): Age -0.4844 0.0319 0.4130 0.0299 
Age spline 60+ 0.2228 0.0422 -0.1717 0.0413 
Age spline 70+ -0.0164 0.0415 -0.0589 0.0402 
Age spline 80+ -0.2369 0.0368 0.1713 0.0351 
Age spline 90+ -0.1028 0.0464 0.0549 0.0470 
Female 1.0897 0.2388 -1.3104 0.2282 
Education 0.2128 0.0385 0.1883 0.0358 
Nonwhite -2.6672 0.2768 1.1884 0.2626 
Hispanic 0.0114 0.4468 -0.5425 0.4222 
Female*age 0.0277 0.0083 -0.0027 0.0080 
Education*age -0.0033 0.0012 -0.0023 0.0012 
Nonwhite*age 0.0586 0.0104 -0.0377 0.0099 
Hispanic*age 0.0118 0.0167 0.0064 0.0155 
Other     4 ordered logit cut points 
 Mortality (m):   
Baseline (α) -5.8253 0.1904   
Latent health (δ) -0.3541 0.0039     
\# individuals 25,497    
\# observations (health) 103,250    
\# parameters 34    
Log-Likelihood -148,652.8       
 
Figure 6-9 shows the relative mortality hazards for males versus females, 
nonwhite versus white respondents, and low- versus high-education respondents. While 
the mortality risk of males relative to females is more or less constant over all ages, 
mortality differences by race and education diminish at older ages. This apparently results 
from the mortality selection effect, with those in better health more likely to survive until 
older ages no matter what their race or education. 
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Figure 6-9: Relative mortality hazards 
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The next three figures show the likelihood of fair or poor SRH (sometimes 
referred to as “poor health”) by gender, race, and education respectively.  Figure 6-10 
shows health paths by gender.  The paths labelled “male” and “female” show 
unconditional health paths of men and women.  The paths labelled “male survivors” and 
“female survivors” show the health of the survivors and account for the strong 
relationship between poor health and mortality (as seen in the figure above).  At age 50, 
both men and women report about the same level of poor health – as discussed above, 
latent health is better for women, but SRH conditional on latent health is worse. It total, 
both effects roughly cancel out.  Poor health increases more rapidly for men than for 
women, as shown by the “male” and “female” paths.  On the other hand, selection due to 
mortality is greater for men than for women, and more men than women reporting poor 
health leave the sample.  Thus the self-reported health of men and women survivors is 
about the same through age 85.  After age 85, the health of women is worse than the 
health of men.  This results entirely from differential mortality.  
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Figure 6-10: Poor health by gender 
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  Note: All simulations for white respondents with 12 years of education 
 
 
Figure 6-11 shows poor health by race.  The figure shows poor health paths for 
white and African American men with 12 years of education.  At age 50, African 
Americans have much more likely than whites to be in poor health.   Through age 70, the 
slopes of the poor health paths (not accounting for mortality) for African American and 
for white respondents are about the same, but mortality is much higher for African 
Americans.  Thus the paths for African American and white survivors converge.  As 
shown in Figure 6-9 above, the mortality differences between African Americans and 
whites diminish at older ages.  On the other hand, the “true” poor health paths start to 
converge after age 70.  Thus the poor health paths of survivors remain roughly parallel at 
older ages, with poor health more likely for African Americans than for whites.  
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Figure 6-11: Poor health by race 
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  Note: All simulations are for male respondents with 12 years of education 
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Figure 6-12 shows poor health paths by education level—8 years of schooling 
(low education) and 16 years (high education).  At age 50, the likelihood of poor health 
for the low-education group is about four times as high as for the high-education group.  
The “true” poor health levels of the two groups increase in parallel to about age 70 and 
thereafter the “true” poor health levels of the two groups start to converge.  In addition, as 
shown in Figure 6-9 above, the difference between the mortality rates of the two groups 
declines at older ages.  Thus the difference in the poor health levels of low- and high-
education survivors starts to converge after age 70, although the poor health level of the 
low-education group remains substantially higher than for the high-education group.    
 
Figure 6-12: Poor health by education 
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7: Conclusions 
To help understand pathways to disability, we have explored the relationship 
between health (and disability) at younger ages and health (and disability) at older ages.  
In particular, we developed an econometric model designed to take account of three key 
features of the data that characterize the health and disability of persons as they age: 
• State dependence:  all past states directly affect the risk of a current bad state, 
• Heterogeneity:  past states contain information on the individual risk that is 
correlated over time, 
• Misclassification:  categorical coding of self-reported health and disability 
induces classification errors. 
The key idea of the model is to consider “true” underlying health status, specified as a  
continuous “latent” variable.  The categorical self-assessed indicators of health (or work 
disability) are determined by this latent health. The underlying continuous latent health 
variable is correlated over time and thus induces correlation over time in the observed 
responses to the categorical self-assessment of health status and disability.  In addition, 
the probability of death is assumed to depend on the “hidden” latent health measure, thus 
allowing for correlation between health status and selection to the group of persons who 
survive from one period to the next.   
 The analysis is based on the four cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS, AHEAD, CODA and WB).  We used the econometric model to simulate future 
mortality and the future health and disability paths of survivors, conditional on health or 
disability at younger ages (age 50).     
We find that health and work disability correspond very closely (in the HRS data).  
We find a very strong relationship between health and disability and mortality.  We find 
that future paths of health and disability are very strongly related to health and disability 
at age 50.  Reversing the process, we find that survival to older ages (80 or 90) provides 
substantial information about health and disability status at younger ages.   
In addition, the interplay between health and mortality of persons as they age can 
be studied in detail using simulations based on the econometric model.  For example:  At 
  Page 51 of 54 
age 50, the poor health level of persons with 8 or fewer years of education is about four 
times as high as the poor health level of those with 16 or more years of education.  The 
“true” poor health levels of the two groups increase in parallel to about age 70 and 
thereafter the “true” poor health levels of the two groups start to converge.   But the 
difference between the mortality rates of the two groups declines at older ages.  Thus the 
difference in the poor health levels of low- and high-education survivors starts to 
converge after age 70, although the poor health level for the low-education group remains 
substantially higher than the level for the high-education group.  Similar “decomposition” 
of mortality and poor health is presented by race and by gender. 
To date, we have used only a few individual socio-economic attributes in the 
model.  Many more attributes, such as specific medical conditions, could be incorporated 
in the model.  The onset of particular medical conditions could held to explain, for 
example, the differences between the health and disability paths of low-education and 
high-education groups or the differences between the health and disability paths by race 
or ethnic group.  Such analysis may also help to understand how future medical 
technology, the coverage and extent of health insurance, and the frequency of prevention may 
change the prevalence of disability. 
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